INTRODUCTION
Modern economic theory makes extensive use of equilibrium concepts, Ž . Nash 1950 equilibrium in particular, when characterizing the solutions to models of strategic interaction. In a Nash equilibrium each player is assumed to correctly anticipate his opponents' strategic behavior when playing the game. This strong assumption motivates the recent literature on ''learning in games. '' Typically, the literature studies the case where a fixed game is played repeatedly by payoff maximizing players. In every stage of the repeated game, each player observes some information about his opponents' realized play at that stage; he then tries to utilize this information in choosing an optimal action for the continuation game. The basic postulate of the literature is that the players use the observations from the past to extrapolate the future. In this sense, the players try to ''learn'' their rivals' future strategies from the realized path of play in the past. The different models studied in the literature vary in the specific assumptions made on the learning rules used by the agents, 1 the objective maximized by the agents, and the information revealed after each stage of the game.
The basic motivation underlying this paper is to suggest an intuitively appealing set of assumptions concerning the learning behavior of agents with bounded rationality and to study the dynamics of such a learning process. In particular, we assume that agents can choose their learning behavior independently throughout the repeated game, and that agents ''learn to learn'' in the sense of trying to choose the ''best'' learning model in every stage of the repeated interaction.
The specific framework we adopt is as follows: Agents with bounded rationality play repeatedly a fixed, finite strategic-form game. Each agent knows his payoff function, but doesn't necessarily know the payoff functions of his rivals. After each stage-game, the agents observe the pure strategies played at that stage; each player examines the history of play up to the current stage, and tries to predict how the other agents will play at the next round. Formally, the realized prediction takes the standard form of a probability distribution over the pure strategy profiles of the player's opponents. The agents are strictly myopic so that in every stage of the game they play a best response to their realized predictions.
Our main result is convergence with probability one to a pure strategy Nash equilibrium pattern, in a large class of games in which the pure equilibria are ''nicely spread.'' That is, when the topology of the stage Ž . game is such that potential pure strategy solutions Kreps, 1990 exist, and are conveniently spread along the lattice of the game, thenᎏwith probability oneᎏthe players will eventually adopt one of these points or, more generally, a finite pattern of such equilibria as a convention on ''how to play the game.'' Ž . In a repeated play of the ''Battle of the Sexes'' Fig. 2 .2 , for example, the players may converge to a symmetric behavior pattern where one pure strategy Nash equilibrium is played on the even dates, and the other pure equilibrium is played on the odd dates. Our model is the first bounded rationality learning model showing that convergence to this intuitively appealing ''taking turns'' solution is theoretically possible. The experimen-1 All through the paper we use ''players'' and ''agents'' interchangeably to denote the set of individuals playing the repeated game. We use the female pronoun ''she'' when talking about Ž . Ž . the rows' player Rows and the matrices' player Mats in a given game; we use ''he'' when Ž . referring to a generic player or the columns' player Cols in a given game. tal literature indeed demonstrates that real subjects may rapidly learn to alternate when playing games with an equilibrium structure similar to that Ž . 2 in the Battle of the Sexes Rapoport et al., 1976 . We suggest two postulates concerning the agents' learning behavior:
Postulate A. Confused learning and random prediction rules. Our players can choose their learning behavior independently. In every stage of the game, each player has the freedom to use complicated formal methods, simple rules of thumb, or even plain intuition in deriving the next period's prediction. Each agent may use different prediction models at different dates. Different agents can use different prediction rules in every date. Typically, the agents feel confused when searching for the ''right'' prediction. The confusion is enhanced whenever a player realizes that his previous prediction was wrong and lead him to a suboptimal play. The player may then abort a prediction model that failed, and search for an alternative rule that seems to fit better the observed path of play.
Formally, we assume that for every history of the game, the prediction rule of each player can be described by a probability distribution over the space of possible predictions. Moreover, we stipulate thatᎏbecause of the strategic confusion described aboveᎏthe model is of ''rich support'' so that with some small proability ⑀ the players can behave in any reasonable Ž . way; e.g., follow the Cournot 1838 best response dynamics, in every stage of the repeated game.
As an interpretation, we suggest an underlying Bayesian model where each agent's learning-behavior-type is drawn independently in every stage of the game. Our probabilistic prediction rules might then be considered the direct product of this Bayesian model. The ⑀ compatibility with best response dynamics discussed above, for example, follows if we assume that there is always a positive probability ⑀ that all players will be of the Cournot-type. With this interpretation, the main convergence result shows that for almost every realization of types, the players will eventually learn to play an equilibrium pattern.
Postulate B. Learning to learn through strategic pattern recognition. Our players ''learn to learn'' by adjusting their learning behavior to the recent developments in the observed path of play. In particular, the players recognize cyclic strategic patterns. As a simple example, consider the case where three strategy profiles, say C, A, B have been played repeatedly, for a long time, in that specific order, so that the history of play at some stage is . . . C, A, B, C, A, B, C, A, B, C, A, B, C, A. We claim that the players must ''recognize'' the repeated pattern if it has been repeated successively with no interruptions a large enough number of times.
3 Upon recognizing the pattern, each player assumes that his opponents will keep following the pattern by playing their part in the profile B on the next stage of the game. Being strictly myopic, he plays a best response to B on the next round. When B is not a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, thenᎏby recognizing the patternᎏthe agents contradict it, since realized play is the best response to B which is different from the pattern's prediction. If, however, B is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, realized play conforms to the pattern's prediction, and expectations are being fulfilled. The players might thus expect that the same pattern will be followed again at the next stage of the game. This demonstrates the basic intuition behind our convergence to an equilibrium-pattern result.
We say ''learning to learn through strategic pattern recognition'' rather than ''learning through strategic pattern recognition'' since the players Ž . switch to what they conceive to be a better learning model whenever they recognize a pattern in the observed play. Moreover, our specific assumptions are flexible enough to accommodate dynamic, nonstationary strategic pattern recognition; e.g., if at some stage of the repeated game an ''unfamiliar'' pattern starts appearing successively in the observed play, then it may take the players a long time, say 60 successive repetitions, to recognize the pattern. If, after a short interruption, the same pattern starts repeating successively once again, then our agents may recognize this familiar pattern earlier, say after 8 successive repetitions.
Our pattern recognition model, however, deals only with the simplest case where the agents recognize cyclic strategic patterns that repeat successively at the observed path of play. Since, broadly interpreted, pattern recognition may encompass almost any form of inductive reasoning and learning, this is far from being a complete model. We hope that the paper will help initiate more research in this field.
Our two behavior postulates are new to the learning in games' literature. 4 The existing literature can be roughly divided as follows: Some papers take a general approach to learning, study a large class of learning 3 The computer sciences literature on pattern recognition typically deals with Bayesianlearning type of problems that are quite different from what we call strategic pattern recognition in this paper. The literature on machine learning however deals with similar Ž issues when analyzing problems in ''sequence extrapolation' ' Laird, 1994; Laird and Ronald, . 1994 . Yet, that literature typically searches for deterministic algorithms that may be used for successful sequence predictions in general, while our goal here is to suggest an intuitively appealing descriptive model of strategic pattern recognition. 4 Ž . Sanchirico 1993 has been working concurrently on a rational probabilistic learning model with an entropy assumption that is similar to our confused learning. Sanchirico's agents don't recognize strategic patterns, however, and in a repeated play of the Battle of the Sexes, they converge to play a pure Nash equilibrium of the game. models on a large class of games, and accordingly prove general, weak Ž . results e.g., Milgrom-Roberts, 1991 . Other papers take a stylized approach, impose structure on the learning models, restrict the class of games under consideration, and then prove strong convergence results Ž . e.g., Krishna, 1992 . In this paper we prove a strong convergence result for a large class of probabilistic learning models on a large class of games. Furthermore, our basic behavioral postulates are intuitively appealing; we believe they would survive empirical testing.
Section 2 of the paper presents two introductory examples that motivate the model and demonstrate the main results. Section 3 provides the formal setting. Section 4 studies the implications of our first behavioral postulate. We prove that a confused search for ''the right way to play a game'' must always reach a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, when the stage game belongs to some large class of ''simple games.'' In Section 5, we superimpose a pattern recognition scheme on the confused learning model of Section 4. The resulting model complies with our two behavioral postulates. We prove that it converges with probability one to a Nash equilibrium pattern when the stage game is simple.
Section 6 suggests that convergence of behavior to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage game is ''incompatible with strategic pattern recognition.'' This implies that a necessary condition for convergence of behavior to a mixed equilibrium is that the agents consider arbitrarily long histories when forming their predictions. In Section 7, we add one assump-Ž . tion to the model to get a general not restricted to simple games , weaker convergence result. Section 8 discusses different properties of the model and considers possible generalizations. Section 9 is a short discussion of the main results.
EXAMPLES

Probabilistic Learning and Reachability of Pure Equilibria
The existing literature on bounded rationality learning in games typically imposes, at the outset, some arbitrary set of assumptions on the players' learning behavior. In many cases, it is even assumed that the players are Ž . born to use some fixed learning heuristic like fictitious play Brown, 1951 Ž . or Cournot dynamics Cournot, 1838 and they follow that given model zealously; no deviations can ever occur. In many applications, however, stationary fictitious play learning and stationary Cournot learning might lead the players to repeated cyclic behavior and score a very low grade in predicting their actual behavior in every stage of the game.
Consider first the fictitious play learning heuristic: In every stage of the game each agent plays a best response to the empirical distribution derived from the observed history of play. The play at the first round is chosen arbitrarily.
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The game in Fig. 2. 1.1 has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium:
It is a Pareto efficient equilibrium that pays each player his maximal payoff. Yet, it is easy to show that for most initial conditions
A, E, L in the sense that the agents play only the strategies in this cycle and change strategies according to the
. B,E ,R, and so on . . . . Moreover, the number of successive repetitions of each strategy in the cycle, in the nth occurrence of the cycle, increases rapidly in n. At some stage of the repeated interaction, the observed Ž . history thus shows that the strategy profile A, E, L has been played for Ž . close to 100,000 periods successively, the strategy profile A, E, R has followed for more than 120,000 rounds successively, and so on . . . . An outside observer facing these dynamics can do an asymptotically perfect job in predicting the players' behavior in every stage of the game by using the alternative Cournot learning heuristic; i.e., by assuming that whatever has been played at the last stage will be played again at the current stage. The fact that the players keep following the fixed fictitious play learning rule although it does such a poor job in predicting their actual behavior seems unreasonable and provides a convincing argument against stationary fictitious play learning in this example.
Is stationary Cournot learning more plausible? Clearly it is not. In the game of Figure 2 .1.1, for most initial conditions, stationary Cournot Since fictitious play and Cournot dynamics seem, a priori, reasonable learning heuristics, their potential instability demonstrates that the bounded rationality learning problem doesn't obtain any ex ante clear solutions.
Ž . We therefore suggest that at the advanced stages of a repeated game the players will feel basically confused when searching for the right way to play the game. This motivates our probabilistic approach to learning and the first behavioral postulate. We further suggest that a probabilistic, confused learning model should always reach a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games similar to that in Fig. 2 .1.1. Consider, in particular, a perturbed Cournot learning model where the players follow the Cournot learning model with high probability in every stage of the game, but each player i may, with some small probability ⑀ , tremble by recognizing strategic patterns of length 2 in the observed past play; i.e., if the last strategy played at some stage of the game is A and somewhere in the observed past play A has been succeeded by B, thenᎏwith probability ⑀ᎏi might play a best response to strategy B on the next stage of the game. Assume further that different players can recognize different patterns in a given history of the game; e.g., if the observed history ends with the string A, B, C, D, A, C, A, then one player might play a Cournot best response to A on the next stage of the game, another player might recognize the pattern A, B and play a best response to B at that stage, while a third player may recognize the pattern A, C and plays a best response to C on the next stage of the game.
The In Section 4 we generalize this example and prove that a probabilistic learning model that always assigns a positive probability to the perturbed Cournot behavior described above must reach a pure equilibrium in some large class of games.
Con¨ergence to Equilibrium Patterns
The well known ''Battle of the Sexes'' of Fig. 2 .2 has two symmetric pure Ž . Ž . strategy Nash equilibria: A, A is Cols' favorite equilibrium while B, B is Rows' favorite. The repeated play of the game has a natural, intuitively Ž . appealing solution where one equilibrium, say A, A , is played on the odd Ž . dates and the other equilibrium, B, B , is played on the even dates. Yet, it is easy to prove that if fictitious play or Cournot learning ever hit a strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium, then the players keep playing that equilibrium forever.
6 These learning heuristics can thus never converge to correlated solutions like that suggested above.
Consider, however, a probabilistic learning model where the players may recognize patterns of length 2 as illustrated in Example 2.1. Assume further that because of the players' confusion about the strategic behavior Ž . of their opponents ''anything'' can happen with positive probability at the first three stages of the repeated game. In particular, there is a positive Ž . Ž . probability that realized play at these three rounds will be A, A , B Ž . is a strict equilibrium iff s s BR s . We use PN ⌫ to denote the set of Ž . pure strategy Nash equilibria of ⌫; S R PN ⌫ is used to denote the Ž . Ž . complementary set. We say that ⌫ is generic iff for every s g S ⌫ , BR s is a singleton.
The Learning Process
Throughout this paper we study the case where a generic, finite strategic-form game is played repeatedly at dates t s 1, 2, . . . . After each stage of the game, every player observes the pure strategy profile played at that stage. We use z to denote the history of the play up to the beginning of t date t; i.e., z s s , s , . . . , s , where
used to denote the space of histories of length t y 1; Z Z denotes the space ϱ of histories in the infinitely repeated game.
That is, facing a given history z , agent i may choose different t predictions for his opponents' behavior at the next round. We assume w.l.g. that the probabilistic rule of his choice is given by a finite support
The finite support assumption is with no loss of generality since we are analyzing games with finite pure strategy spaces so that for every
there exists a finitẽ t support probability distribution i that generates the same probabilistic
we use z y tõ t t t denote the probability assigned to the prediction y by the probabilistic i Ž . Ž i Ž .. Ž . prediction rule z ; supp z is used to denote the finite support of
Ž .
For any finite set X we use card X to denote the cardinality of X. Following the myopia assumption we assume that for every history z ,
for any realization of the random prediction rule z , agent i plays a t t i Ž . best response to his realized prediction. z is used to denote the probat t i Ž . bilistic beha¨ior rule derived from the probabilistic prediction rule z t t Ž i Ž .. given the myopia assumption; i.e., assuming that card BR y s 1 for
on ⌫. Assuming further that the agents behave independently, we get that
for each t, the collection determines a distribution on Z Z . By ig I t t s1 t a standard application of Kolmogorov's extension theorem we can extend Ž . the process to Z Z ; Z Z , F F, P P is used to denote the extended space.
When card BR y ) 1 for some y in the support of z , the corresponding myopic
w x behavior rule also depends on the tie-breaking rule. Using q и¬ y : BR y ¬ 0, 1 to denote
i a tie breaking rule for agent i so that Ý q x ¬y s1 , we define z x s
Strategic Patterns
We say that p is a strategic pattern in a game ⌫ iff p is a finite sequence Since we will be dealing a lot with appearances of strategic patterns in given histories, we define special projection functions, PRO, that will be used to denote subsequences of histories and patterns:
Let s s , s , . . . , s be a sequence of length t of pure strategies in ⌫.
Similarly, we define an extension operator, EXT, so that for every t X ) t,
Ž .
X EXT p is used to denote the sequence generated by copying the 1, t pattern p repeatedly until we get a sequence of length t X ; i.e.,
Ž .
We say that a pattern p has appeared in a given history z if the obvious t Ž .
X Ä Ž . 4 definition holds; i.e., t y 1 G l p and ᭚ t g l p , . . . , t y 1 such that Ž .
X X PRO z s p.
CONFUSED LEARNING LEADING TO PURE EQUILIBRIA
In this section we study the implications of the first behavioral postulate. We show that a confused search for ''the right way to play the game'' must always reach a pure strategy Nash equilibrium when the stage game is what we define to be ''simple.'' The basic intuition underlying this reachability result is that random prediction rules that always assign a positive probability to the Cournot prediction on one hand, and tremble independently across players on the other hand, must reach a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in many applications. The following stylized example is used to motivate our definition of ''simple games.'' 8 The definition above considers only the case where all the players are involved in playing Ž . each strategy along the pattern i.e., s g S for every l . In the sequel we call this type of t patterns patterns of full dimensionality. In Section 8.2 we briefly discuss patterns of partial dimensionality that may involve a strict subset of the set of players. Note that the Matching Pennies subgame is best-response-closed in the sense that the best response to every strategy in this subgame is, again, in that subgame. We suggest that myopic players that happened to play some strategy in this closed subgame at the first stage of the repeated game Ž . might with a positive probability keep playing the strategies in that ''closed subgame'' forever, and never reach the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the complete game. Our reachability result will thus be restricted to games that don't contain such closed subgames. We proceed with the formal definitions.
DEFINITION. Uniform reachability of PN equilibria. Let ⌫ be a finite Ž . Ž . strategic-form game with PN ⌫ / л. A learning model , on ⌫ satisfies uniform reachability of PN equilibria iff ᭚⑀ ) 0, such that for Ž . Ž every t, and for each z g Z Z satisfying P P
, is a strategic-form game
. . , such that for every i g I, S : S , and ˆîî is the restriction of to = S .
U . We use ⌫ : ⌫ to denote a strategic-form subgame of ⌫. S ⌫ is used to denote the pure strategy profiles in ⌫ U .
DEFINITION. BR-closed subgame. Let ⌫ be a finite strategic-form game.
DEFINITION. Simple strategic-form game. A strategic form game ⌫ is BR-simple iff every BR-closed subgame ⌫ U : ⌫ contains a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of ⌫.
Consider now a probabilistic learning model on a simple strategic-form game that satisfies the following condition:
There is a fixed positive probability ⑀ such that for each player i:
Ž . Ž . a If the last observation at some advanced enough stage of the repeated game is s, then the probability that i will play a best response to Ž s in the next stage of the game is at least ⑀ we call this condition ''⑀ . compatibility with BR dynamics'' , and Ž .
Ž . b If the last observation at some advanced enough stage of the repeated game is s, and somewhere in the observed past play s has been followed by s X , then the probability that i will ''recognize the pattern s, s X ,'' in the sense that he will expect his rivals to play s X once again in the next 
DEFINITION. ⑀ compatibility with sophisticated BR dynamics. A learn-Ž . ing model , on a strategic-form game ⌫ is ⑀ compatible with sophisticated BR dynamics iff ᭚T and
Ž . In the sequel we say that , is a confused learning model on ⌫ iff Ž . , satisfies ⑀ compatibility with BR dynamics and ⑀ compatibility with sophisticated BR dynamics. The following proposition asserts that confused learning implies uniform reachability of pure strategy Nash equilibria when the stage game is simple. 
CONFUSED LEARNING WITH PATTERN RECOGNITION
Introduction
In this section we superimpose a pattern recognition scheme on the confused learning model of Section 4. Note that confused learning is incompatible with strategic pattern recognition; compatibility with BR dynamics, for example, implies that for every BR cycle in the game, for every natural n, there is a positive probability that the players repeat the cycle n times successively. Our model will distinguish between two distinct learning modes: A confused learning mode where the players find the observed history hard to interpret and many learning behaviors can occur, and a pattern recognition mode where the players recognize some strategic pattern in the observed history of play.
The basic idea of the model can be summarized schematically as follows: For large enough t, for every history z , the model is in exactly one of the t following three states. In formally defining a ''confused learning model with strategic pattern recognition'' we will often refer to the number of times a fixed pattern has appeared successively in a given history of the game. Thus, we would not want to call a sequence like A, B, C, A, B, C, A, B, C a strategic pattern, but rather we would consider that sequence as three successive repetitions of the basic pattern A, B, C. Formally, we define recursively the collection of basic strategic patterns of length n in a fixed game ⌫, SP , as follows:
EXT SP for every n s 2, 3, . . . .
We then say that p is a basic pattern in ⌫ iff p is an element of D SP . We use S S P P to denote the collection of basic patterns in ⌫ plus ng N N n Ž . a unique empty pattern ; i.e., S S P P s D SP j . We say that a 
The Con¨ergence Result
To formally define a confused learning model with strategic pattern recognition on a strategic-form game ⌫, we superimpose on the original model described in Section 3, a function : D ϱ Z Z ¬ S S P P that is used to In the sequel we call a pattern recognition frame on ⌫. We proceed by Ž . imposing specific assumptions on the collection , , .
The first two assumptions A.1 and A.2 are very similar to the ''confused learning'' assumptions of Section 4. The only difference is that now we restrict these assumptions to those cases where the agents are in the confused learning mode.
Assumption A.1. Conditional compatibility with BR dynamics. ᭚T, Ž .
Assumption A.2. Conditional compatibility with sophisticated BR dynam-Ž . ics. ᭚T and ᭚⑀ ) 0 such that ᭙ t G T, ᭙ z g Z Z for which z s , and
Note that Assumptions A.1 and A.2 impose some independence-acrossperiods on the random prediction rules; e.g., even if the player has failed to comply with BR dynamics over a long period, there is still an ⑀ probability that she will comply with this behavior at the next stage of the game. Note further that these ⑀-probability assumptions are the only restrictions imposed on the players' behavior when facing the confusedmode histories. Thus, with some probability 1 y ⑀ X , the agents can behave Ž . in any arbitrary way e.g., follow fictitious play when observing such histories.
We proceed by complementing these confused learning assumptions with a set of assumptions on strategic pattern recognition. Basically, we Ž . would want to stipulate that ) for every strategic pattern p there is a Ž uniform bound, say T , such that the players must recognize p with p . probability one whenever it has appeared almost T times successively at Yet, it is easy to show that any such set of assumptions is internally inconsistent in the sense that for some histories the players will be Ž . required to recognize two or more contradicting patterns with probability one. For example, if the best response to strategy B is C, the bound for the pattern A, B is 4, and the bound for the pattern A, B, A, B, A, B , A, C is 3, then if the observed history ends with the string A, B, A, B, A, B, A,  C, A, B, A, B, A, B, A, C, A, B, A, B, A, B , A the players must simultaneously recognize both patterns with probability one. That is, each player must play a best response to B with probability one and a best response to C with probability one at the same timeᎏa possible inconsistency.
To resolve the problem we assume that our bounded rationality players can fully recognize only patterns of length shorter than some fixed bound L.
9 Assuming then that the bounds T are large enough relative to L we p Ž . may reformulate ) to get an internally consistent set of assumptions. Since we only impose ⑀-probability assumptions on the players' behavior in the confused learning mode, the players may still partially recognize patterns of length ) L with some high X Ž X . probability 1 y ⑀ where ⑀ is a function of ⑀ and the structure of the specific pattern . these sufficient conditions are stationary in the sense that the agents always recognize a given pattern after some fixed number of successive repetitions. In the next section we claim that this stationary approach is ''too stylized'' and thus suggest a generalized model where the agents can modify their pattern recognition behavior along the repeated game. The simplistic scheme suggested above, however, is sufficient for our main convergence result:
DEFINITION. Confused learning with stationary pattern recognition. Let Ž . , be a myopic learning model on a generic, strategic-form game ⌫.
Ž . We say that , is a confused learning model with stationary pattern 10 
Ž .
The assumption can be generalized by requiring that for every pattern p with l p F L Ä Ž .4 there is a summable sequence ␤ p , such that whenever p appears n G T times n n gN N p Ž . successively, the probability that each player recognizes the pattern is G 1 y ␤ p . To n Ž . simplify the exposition we restrict the analysis above to the case where ␤ p s 0 for large n. n 11
The stronger assumption T и l p G 3L is used in the Proof of Proposition 5.2. The probability of convergence to a specific pattern is not necessarily decreasing in the pattern's length in our model. In a repeated play of the Ž . Battle of the Sexes Fig. 2 .2 , for example, if the agents basically play the Ž . Ž . PN pattern A, A , B, B repeatedly, but ''tremble'' with some small probability ⑀ to satisfy the confused learning assumptions A.1 and A.2, Ž . Ž . then the probability of convergence to A, A , B, B goes to one as ⑀ approaches 0. In general note that since we have only imposed ⑀-probabil-Ž ity conditions on the agents' behavior in the confused mode and left their . complete behavior unspecified , ''new'' patterns of length G 2 may emerge with high probability even when ⑀ is arbitrarily small. The specific distribution of PN patterns adopted by the agents at the limit might thus take many different forms.
Nonstationary Pattern Recognition
In the Introduction we emphasized the motivation to present an intuitively appealing set of assumptions on learning by agents of bounded rationality. The basic model presented in the previous section, however, seems too stylized to fit any realistic learning effort. The problem follows from the fact that the players in that model always recognize each pattern p after some fixed, history-independent number of successive repetitions, T . Consider, for example, the case where the players always recognize the p singleton pattern A after 100 successive repetitions. Assume that the best response to A is B. Given the rich-support assumptions of the model, 12 Ž . y1 Existence is trivial. Just choose a positive probability ⑀ -card S , an integer L, and a Ž . corresponding collection of T 's that satisfy the conditions of Assumption B.2. Let , be p any learning model where the agents recognize a pattern iff the sufficient conditions hold, and whereᎏin the confused learning modeᎏfor every strategy profile s that has been observed in the past-play, each player plays a best response to s with probability at least ⑀. realized play might be 100 times 100 times 100 times 100 times ! # " ! # " ! # " ! # " We suggest that this behavior is unreasonable, and that the agents should Ž . recognize the ''familiar'' singleton pattern A with probability one sooner; i.e., after a smaller number of cyclic repetitions, when the observed history is as above. In this section we present a generalized version of the model that accommodates such ''dynamic pattern recognition. '' In the generalized model, the agents can change their pattern-recognition patterns as the game evolves. Different agents might have different inclinations for strategic pattern recognition. These individual inclinations Ž . might even change along the game. The notation z s p / will now t be used to denote the case where at least one player believes that he has Ž . identified a cyclic pattern in the observed path of play; z s will still t denote the default mode where all the players feel confused when observing z . Assumptions A.1, A.2, B.1, and B.2 still hold in the modified model. If, at some stage of the repeated game, some ''unfamiliar'' pattern starts repeating successively in the observed play, it might take the players a long time, say, 100 successive repetitions, to recognize that pattern. If, however, after a short interruption, the same pattern starts repeating successively once again, the players might recognize it earlier, after 20 cyclic repetitions. If the same pattern starts repeating successively once moreᎏfor the third time in a relatively short period of timeᎏthe players might recognize it even earlier, after 3 successive repetitions.
We argued above that in the modified model, the pattern recognition mode should represent those cases where at least one player believes that his opponents follow some cyclic pattern. Assumption B.2 stipulates that, at the limit, if the pattern has repeated successively a large enough number of times, all the players recognize it with probability one. In general, however, it might be the case that only one player recognizes a pattern in a given history of the game, while the other players are still ''confused'' when observing the same history. The following Assumption B.4 says that in such cases, each player recognizes the pattern with some positive probability ␦.
Assumption B.4. Coordinated pattern recognition. There is a positive probability ␦ such that for every basic pattern p, for every history z for
Ž . For example, if z s . . . , A, B, C, A, B, C, A, B, C, A and z s C, t t
A , B , the assumption implies that with probability at least ␦ car dŽ I . , the players recognize the pattern C, A, B by playing a best response to the pattern's prediction, strategy B, at the next stage of the game.
One undesirable complication that may arise from using minimal necessary conditions for pattern recognition is that the agents might recognize one pattern, then immediately recognize a different pattern that was generated when the previous pattern was contradicted and so on . . . . If, for example, the best response to some strategy B is C, and the agents recognize the pattern A, C, A, B in some history z , then the extended t history z ends with the sequence A, C, A, C so that the necessarỹ tq1 conditions for recognizing the pattern C, A hold. The next assumption says Ž that if z is a history that ends with pattern contradiction i.e., if the t players were in the pattern recognition mode given the corresponding . history z and the pattern has been contradicted at date t y 1 , then the ty1 agents will not recognize new patterns for a while. Specifically, a necessary condition for recognizing a ''new'' pattern p X at some future date t q k is Ž X . that k is bigger than l p . When applied to the example above, the assumption implies that the agents cannot be in the pattern recognition mode with respect to the pattern C, A given the extended history z . 
Ž . Ž .
X X and b z s p for some basic pattern p , it must be the case that
Recalling the two postulates concerning the agents' learning behavior, confused learning, and pattern recognition, we may interpret B.5 as fixing the priorities between these basic assumptions. The agents' fundamental strategic confusion is stronger than their belief in strategic pattern recog-Ž . nition in the advanced stages of the game before convergence .
The following final assumption complements the caution assumption. It says that if the agents are in the pattern recognition mode with respect to some pattern p given the history z and realized play at date t conforms to t the pattern's prediction, then the agents stay in the pattern recognition Ž . mode with respect to the appropriate shift of the same pattern. 
CONVERGENCE OF BEHAVIOR TO A MIXED EQUILIBRIUM
Can the agents' behavior converge to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in our strictly myopic learning environment?
The concept of ''convergence of behavior strategies'' was proposed by Ž . Fudenberg and Kreps 1993 as a more appropriate notion of convergence to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium than the previously used ''conver-Ž . gence of beliefs or empirical frequencies '' criterion. Formally, Fudenberg and Kreps studied the following definition of local stability:
Let , be a myopic learning model on a strategic-form game ⌫. A mixed strategy profile U is said to be Ž . locally stable with respect to , iff for every ⑀ ) 0 there is some Ž Ž .
Fudenberg and Kreps presented two constructions under which local stability of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium profile is technically possible. In the first construction, the players maintain the equilibrium beliefs unless and until sufficient evidence against these beliefs has accumulated. Moreover, when facing the equilibrium beliefs, the players choose the ''right'' tie-breaking rules; that is, the equilibrium strategies. In the second construction, the players maintain the empirical beliefs but they are only asymptotically myopic. Thus, they keep playing the equilibrium strategies unless and until the cost of doing so becomes too large. As discussed by Ž . Fudenberg and Kreps 1993, p. 346 , ''in both constructions the players use precisely the equilibrium strategies with no positive reason at all. . . . Thus, although the constructions show that convergence to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is possible, neither one convinces us that it would in fact happen, except perhaps for players who have been trained in game theory and therefore know how they are 'expected' to act.''
The players in our model, however, are strictly myopic, and in general know nothing about game theory and equilibrium analysis. In this setting, a necessary condition for convergence of intended behavior to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is that the predictions reach the equilibrium strategies and stay there forever. This seems ''too strong to be possible'' in our bounded rationality, incomplete information environment. As noted by Ž . Jordan 1993 , generically, a mixed strategy is expected-payoff maximizing for some player only if the expected mixed strategies of the other players lie in a subspace of lower dimension of the corresponding strategies' space.
14 i Ž yi . Fudenberg and Kreps studied a deterministic learning model where : Z Z ¬ ⌬ S .
t t
Although our probabilistic prediction rules are different, the resulting myopic behavior rules are of the same form in both cases.
Since the number of finite histories of play is countable, it is a priori unlikely that the players' expectations will ever lie in the subspace for which the mixed strategy is a best response. Moreover, we now show that convergence of behavior to any fixed Ž . behavior strategy that is not a pure equilibrium is incompatible with strategic pattern recognition in the sense that the players don't recognize some patterns even when they appear successively an arbitrarily large number of times.
Ž
. DEFINITION. C C incompatibility with pattern recognition. Let , bẽ a myopic learning model on a strategic-form game ⌫. Let C C be ã Ž . collection of basic patterns in ⌫. A learning model , is said to be C C incompatible with pattern recognition iff for every ⑀ ) 0 there is some Ž history z such that P P F F p has appeared n times successi¨elỹ
In the following proposition we use C C to denote the family of basic patterns that correspond to the mixed strategy U ; i.e., p s s , s , . . . , s An important immediate Corollary to Proposition 6 is that convergence of behavior to some mixed strategy profile U is impossible if there exists a uniform bound T such that each player always plays a best response to some strategy that has been observed in the last T periods. In this sense, a necessary condition for convergence of behavior to a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is that the players consider arbitrarily long histories when forming their predictions. Agents with bounded memory can never converge to play a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
A GENERAL CONVERGENCE RESULT
By adding one assumption to the model of Section 5 we now get a general convergence result for finite strategic-form games. The extra assumption, )-adaptiveness, says that for every subset E of pure strategies in the game, there is a uniform bound T , such that whenever the realized E play at the last T periods of the game is a subset of E, the probability E that each player will play a best response to some strategy in E on the next stage of the game is one. In the formal definition that follows we use the
Ž . Assumption C. )-adaptiveness. For every E : S ⌫ , there is a bound Ž .
X T such that for every history z with t G T for which
It is easy to prove that Assumption C doesn't contradict our previous assumptions A.1, A.2, and B.1᎐B.6 if the bounds T are chosen appropri-E ately.
Recalling that a subgame ⌫ U is closed iff the best response to each strategy in the subgame is in the subgame, we say that a closed subgame ⌫ U is minimal iff it doesn't contain another closed subgame. Note that every strict pure strategy Nash equilibrium is a minimal closed subgame. Note also that in games that don't have strict equilibria, it might be the Ž . Ž case that the unique minimal closed subgame is the game itself e.g., . Matching Pennies . In the following proposition we use ''convergence to Ä U MCS with no PN'' to denote the event: s g ⌫ eve., for some minimal To demonstrate the implications of Proposition 7, consider again the stylized example of Figure 4 .1. The game in that figure has three minimal closed subgames: The two strict Nash equilibria and the Matching Pennies subgame. Our result thus implies that a confused learning model with strategic pattern recognition on that game that satisfies the additional assumption C must either converge to the Matching Pennies subgame, or to some PN pattern in the Battle of the Sexes subgame.
GENERALIZATIONS AND DISCUSSION
OF ASSUMPTIONS
Relaxing Strict Myopia
The strict myopia assumption was used in the Introduction to motivate our confused learning and strategic pattern recognition postulates. Indeed, these assumptions seem to suit best a learning environment where the agents are strictly myopic. In this section, however, we informally suggest 15 Ä 4 Ž . E eve. is used to denote the event lim inf E Billingsley, 1986 . that the myopia assumption can be relaxed to some degree. Our agents may try to take account of the more distant future when searching for the ''best'' move for the next stage of the game. 16 The players are of bounded rationality, however, and thus they don't follow rigorously the Bayesian Ž . Ž . learning scheme Kalai and Lehrer, 1993 . Moreover, we assume that: 1 Ž learning is basically confused so that many different behaviors e.g., those
. corresponding to Cournot dynamics and sophisticated Cournot dynamics Ž . may occur in most advanced stages of the game and 2 the agents recognize cyclic patterns in the observed path of play. Any learning model that satisfies these assumptions must converge to a PN pattern when the stage game is simple.
Note that convergence to a PN pattern can be given a nonmyopic justification in many applications, by assuming that whenever a player detects a recurrent pattern in the path of play, he believes that his rivals will keep following the pattern if he follows the pattern, while any deviation on his part will trigger a painful retaliation by his opponents. Yet, ''Compatibility with Strategic Pattern Recognition'' must be given some myopic justification in certain applications. In a repeated play of the Ž . Prisoner's Dilemma Fig. 8.1 , for example, compatibility with singleton pattern recognition implies that any string of repeated Cooperation must come to an end at some stage of the repeated game. It thus precludes the Ž possibility that both players adopt some ''tit for tat'' that is, ''she will cooperate as long as I cooperate, but she will fiercely retaliate if I . deviate'' type of conjectures concerning their opponents' behavior in the repeated game.
To justify myopia, the literature typically suggests that the players are impatient and thus discount the future heavily, or that the players ignore the impact of their current strategic behavior on the future play of their opponents because of their bounded rationality. To get a more palatable Ž . justification of the assumption, Fudenberg and Kreps 1993 invoked a 16 Technically, this can be done by reformulating our basic model so that the assumptions Ž . only refer to the behavior rules, bypassing the not necessarily myopic prediction process from which the agents arrive at these behaviors. large population story assuming that players are repeatedly drawn from Ž . some large populations, so that: 1 repeated meetings between a given set Ž . of players are rare and 2 each player is unaware of how his specific opponents at some given stage of the game have acted in the previous rounds in which they were called to play. Alternatively, we may assume that players have a finite life span, and that once a player dies, he is immediately replaced by an identical offspring that observes the entire history upon joining the game. Assuming that the players are of bounded rationality and their life span is random and relatively short, we hypothesize that strictly myopic behavior will emerge.
Other Forms of Pattern Recognition
The strategic pattern recognition scheme suggested in the previous Ž . sections has the following restrictive features: 1 It only considers patterns of full dimensionality that are built from pure strategy profiles in the game Ž . and specify the behavior of all the players simultaneously. 2 Players may fully recognize a pattern only if it has appeared successively with no interruptions at the end of the observed history of play. This section is a brief discussion of some of the ''other cases'' where strategic pattern recognition might seem appropriate.
Consider first the case where a pattern appears successively with noncontradicting interruptions. For example, take z s A, B, C, A, A, B, C,   t   D, A, B, C, A, D, A, B, C, D, C, C, A, B , where the pattern A, B, C has appeared four times but the successive appearances of the pattern have been interrupted by some random sequence of strategies that don't include a contradicting pattern of the type A, B, s, where s is some strategy profilẽd ifferent from C. Formally, we may say that a strategic pattern p of length n G 2 in a Ž . strategic-form game ⌫ has appeared N times successi¨ely with interruptions Ä in a gi¨en history z iff there is a sequence of N indexes in n, n q 1, . . . , t t 4 Ž . y 1 , say i F i F иии F i , such that 1 p has appeared at i for every
. . , N, and 2 for each t g i , . . . , t y 2 , if PRO z s1
The agents of Section 5 cannot fully recognize patterns that have appeared successively with interruptions; e.g., given any history ending with A, B, in which the pattern A, B, C has appeared n times successively with Ž interruptions so that the necessary conditions for recognizing the pattern . A, B, C as defined in Section 5 don't hold , there is a positive probability ⑀ that the players with follow Cournot dynamics and play a best response to 17 In the case of singleton patterns the only definition of successive appearances that makes sense is the one requiring no interruptions. the strategy B on the next stage of the game. If the best response to B is different from the best response to C, the probability of recognizing the pattern A, B, C given such a history is bounded above by 1 y ⑀ , independently of n.
Similarly, the agents of Section 5 cannot recognize with probability one patterns of partial dimensionality that involve a proper subset of the set of players; our model ignores such patterns even when ''all the other players except player i successively repeat a given pattern'' although one may claim thatᎏas far as player i is concernedᎏthese patterns are almost equivalent to patterns of full dimensionality.
We also ignore the following types of patterns:
ᎏStochastic patterns where, for example, the strategy profile A is ''always'' followed by B or by C, but in no specific order.
ᎏ''Patterns of patterns'' where, for example, the patterns A, B and A, C appear repeatedly, one after the other, but in between the appear-Ž . ance of A, B and the following appearance of A, C and vice versa there appears a sequence of strategies of random length and random structure that doesn't include the strategy A.
ᎏTime related patterns where, for example, agent i plays strategy s ĩ on Friday.
To defend the narrow scope of our pattern recognition scheme, we may first argue that these other patterns are somewhat more difficult to observe, and thus there is ''always''ᎏno matter how many times such a pattern appears successivelyᎏa positive probability ⑀ X that the agents will fail to recognize it. An additional excuse for ignoring patterns of partial dimensionality may be based on the notion of sophisticated learning Ž . Milgrom and Roberts, 1991 . A sophisticated player observing a recognizable pattern of partial dimensionality might expect that the players involved in playing the pattern will respond on the next stage of the game to the latest changes that have occurred in the play of those agents that are Ž . not following the pattern these may include the player himself . He thus may be uncertain whether these players will keep following the pattern on the next stage of the repeated game, and feel, overall, ''confused'' about the future course of the game.
At the same time we claim that the main convergence result should hold even if the agents are able to recognize some of the other patterns mentioned above. The basic intuition still applies: The confused learning forces should lead the players to an equilibrium pattern when the stage game is simple. The players may adopt such a pattern as a fixed behavioral convention on playing the game. In Appendix 2 we briefly outline a variation on the original model in which the agents can recognize patterns that appear successively with interruptions.
Justifying the Uniform Assumptions
The following example demonstrates that the uniform component of uniform reachability is essential to the main convergence result; i.e., the weaker confused learning assumptions: ''For every confused-mode-history there is a positive probability that the players follow the BR dynamics and each of the behaviors associated with the sophisticated BR dynamics'' are not sufficient for the main convergence result.
Fix a strategic-form game ⌫ where s and s / s are non-Nash pure It is straightforward to verify that the model described above is a ''confused learning model with strategic pattern recognition'' if the bound L is set equal to 1, and if we relax the uniform part of the confused Ž . Ž learning assumptions A.1 and A.2 as discussed above . Yet, P P con-
. Ž . vergence to a PN pattern s 1 y Ł 1 y ␣ -1, since the product
1y␣ converges whenever the sequence ␣ is summable. Some of the informal interpretations of Nash equilibria in the fundamental literature on game theory are ''a steady state of an environment in Ž . which the players act repeatedly'' Osborne and Rubinstein, 1993 , and ''some convention . . . concerning how to play the game. . . . a learned Ž . behavior' ' Kreps, 1990 . Our results support these interpretations ᎏas far as pure strategy Nash equilibria of the stage game are concerned. When the stage game is simple, agents of bounded rationality that know nothing about game theory and equilibrium analysis may adopt a fixed pattern of such equilibria as a ''behavioral convention'' or a ''steady state solution'' to the game.
We were unable to derive any positive results concerning the general concept of mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. We have moreover shown that adaptive agents with bounded memory can never converge to play a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. In this respect, we follow Fudenberg and Kreps 1994 , 1995 , Jordan 1993 , and Kalai and Lehrer 1995 in questioning the adequacy of Nash equilibrium as an attainable solution to strategic games.
Our basic postulates, confused learning and strategic pattern recognition, are intuitively appealing, and we believe they would survive empirical testing. The model also provides a natural channel through which the context within which the repeated game is played can influence the equilibrium selection. In a repeated play of the Battle of the Sexes, for example, if one player is more aggressive than the other in the sense that Ž . she is less willing to settle on say equilibrium B that gives her the lower payoff, then our agents may converge to an equilibrium pattern like A, A, A, B or A, A, B, A, B in which the aggressive player gets a higher average payoff than her opponent.
The work is a first attempt to model strategic pattern recognition. We hope it will help to initiate more research on this important subject.
APPENDIX 1: PROOFS OMITTED IN THE TEXT
In all the following proofs we assume w.l.g. that the ⑀ of the compatibility with BR dynamics assumption and the ⑀ of the compatibility with sophisticated BR dynamics assumption are equal.
Ž
. Proof of Proposition 4 and a reachability lemma . While proving the Ž . proposition, we will also prove a reachability lemma Lemma 4.1 that is essential for proving the convergence results of Propositions 5.2, 5.3, and 7. Ž Our specific plan is as follows: Recalling the compatibility with sophisti-. cated BR dynamics assumptions of Proposition 4, we define a binary Ž . relation on the pure strategies' set, C reachability in n steps . We say that s , s , . . . , s is a C sequence iff for every m s 1, 2, . . . , n, 0 1 n for every i g I, one of the two conditions stated in the definition of C reachability holds. Note that C reachability is a transitive relation, and that Ž every BR sequence is a C sequence. Note also that since we restrict the . analysis to generic games once a C sequence hits a PN equilibrium it must Ž . stay there forever; i.e., if s , s , . . . , s is a C sequence, and s g PN ⌫ We now show that in simple games, pure strategy Nash equilibria are ''always'' C reachable in no more than COMP steps. Before stating and proving this result formally we have to introduce some additional terminology:
Let z s s , s , . . . , s be a C sequence. We say that strategy s X has 0 0 1 k
Ž .
X appeared in the sequence z at date t iff the singleton pattern s has 0 Ž .
X Y appeared in that sequence at date t . We say that the pair s , s has Ž .
X Y appeared in the sequence z at date t iff the pattern s , s has appeared 0 Ž . in that sequence at date t . We say that the sequence z is pair-wise 0 disjoint iff no pair has appeared in the sequence in two different dates. We say that the sequence contains no repetitions if no element in the sequence has appeared in both dates t and t q 1 for some t.
For any sequence of strategy profiles in ⌫, say s , . . . , s , we use 1 n Ä 4 s, . . . , s to denote the set corresponding to that sequence; i.e., s g Ž . X, we use SG X to denote the subgame generated by the strategies in X; 
Ž . Proof. Let s g S R PN ⌫ . We prove the lemma by proving the exis-0 tence of a pair-wise disjoint, no repetitions C sequence leading from s to 0 a PN. Note that the number of distinct strategy pairs s
, which is the bound given in the lemma.
Let X denote the space of pair-wise disjoint, no repetitions C sequences starting from s . Note that X is nonempty since it includes the one 0 element sequence s . Let % denote the set inclusion partial ordering on 0 X; i.e., for every two sequences in X, say z s s , s , . . . , s , and z s
By Hausdorff maximal principle there exists a pair-wise disjoint, no repetitions C sequence in X that is maximal under the set inclusion partial ordering. That is, there is a pair-wise disjoint, no repetitions C sequence, say z s s , s , . . . , s such that no sequence in X is an extension of z . We now show that s must be a PN in ⌫.
n Assume by way of contradiction that s is not a PN. Note that if s has n n not appeared at some date t -n in the sequence z , then s , s , . . . , s , 0 0 1 n Ž . BR s is a pair-wise disjoint, no repetitions C extension of z , which n 0 contradicts the maximality of z . 0 Thus, if s is not a PN, it must have appeared at some date t -n in the n Since ⌫ is simple, if SGA is closed, it must contain a PN equilibrium, say
P P s s s for some n G t ¬ z G ⑀ , whenever the conditional n t Ž . probability is well defined, and , satisfies uniform reachability of PN equilibria. B
In the following proofs, we sometimes use conditional probability state-Ž . Ž . ments of the form P P E ¬ z without writing down the P P z ) 0
qualification. The condition is assumed implicitly.
Proof of Proposition 5.2. Fix a generic, simple, strategic-form game ⌫. Ž . Let , be a confused learning model with stationary pattern recognition on ⌫. We start by proving three straightforward lemmas. Lemma 5.2.1 says that if the conditional probability of convergence to a PN pattern given the history z is uniformly bounded below across histories by some t positive ⑀ , then the model converges to a PN pattern with probability one. Lemma 5.2.2 states an obvious implication of Assumption B.2: If the players recognize a PN pattern at some stage of the repeated game, then they must converge to that pattern. Similarly, Lemma 5.2.3 shows that if the players recognize a pattern that is not a PN pattern at some stage of the repeated game, then the pattern must be contradicted within the next L stages of the game.
LEMMA 5.2.1. Assume there is some ⑀ ) 0 and an integer T such that for 
. Note that by standard arguments the event ⌳ s''convergence to a PN pattern'' is in the field generated by the s 's, and thus is F F measurable. t Ž . By the Paul Levy zero᎐one law Chung, p. 341 the probability of ⌳ conditional on z X approaches the indicator function of ⌳ as t X approaches t Ž . infinity. Since, by ) , ⌳ has a probability less than 1 given some history z , t there exist continuations of z on which the conditional probability of ⌳ t can be made arbitrarily small. That is, for every ␦ X ) 0, ᭚ z X such that t Ž X .
X P P convergence to a PN pattern ¬ z F ␦ . least one element that is not a PN, the probability that it will be contradicted within L repetitions of the process described above is at least ␦ LиcardŽ I .
. B
The statement of Lemma 5.3.4 is identical to that made in Lemma 5.2.4 and we will not repeat it. The proof however is different since now the conditions under which the model can get into the pattern recognition mode are weaker than before. However, the additional caution assumption B.5 implies that the basic construction used to prove Lemma 5.2.4, can be applied in the generalized model as well. follows that p s s U , a contradiction. B Proposition 5.3 follows immediately from the three lemmas proved above and from Lemma 4.2.1. The basic argument is identical to the one used to prove Proposition 5.2 from Lemmas 5.2.1᎐5.2.4. We will not repeat it.
Proof of Lemma
Proof of Proposition 6. First note that in order to prove the proposition it is enough to prove that there is some history z such that t Ž .
U P PF F phas appeared n times successively ¬ z ) 0. Since P P ⌳ ) 0, it follows that P P F F p has ap-
Ž . Ž . peared n times successively ) 0, so that , is C C incompatible with pattern recognition. B Proof of Proposition 7. The proof is a direct extension of the Proof of Proposition 5.3. We present the ''new elements'' in the proof in three Ž . simple lemmas 7.1᎐7.3 . First, we claim that the conditions stated in the )-adaptiveness assumption are sufficient for convergence to a MCS; i.e., whenever a minimal closed subgame E has been played at for T periods PN and repeat the arguments given in the Proof of Lemma 4.1 with the following small change. When considering the case where SGA is closed distinguish between two subcases: Ž . U Ž A SGA contains a PN equilibrium, say s , in which case argue as in .
assumption B.2 can be restricted to the strong pattern recognition mode and we prefer not to extend it to cases of weak pattern recognition since the notion of n successive repetitions with interruptions is general enough to accommodate many different histories including some in which the interruptions between the successive repetitions of the pattern are very short, and others in which these interruptions are quite long and of a confusing nature; we thus do not wish to impose a uniform bound on the number of successive repetitions with interruptions after which the agents recognize patterns with probability 1. The necessary conditions for strong pattern recognition will be the same as those stated in Assumption B.3 of Section 5; i.e., we keep Assumption Ž . B.3 but restrict it to the cases where z s p, S for some basic pattern
